In
Christian Theology one can never escape attempting to answer the question, “If
God is omnipotent, all benevolent, and omniscient, why are pain, suffering, and
evil in the world he watches over?” What Leibniz offers in the Discourse on Metaphysics is this answer:
because it is necessary. For Leibniz, it is necessary that one person suffer if
it means the world will benefit from it. As Leibniz states in the Theodicy, if
there is “an infinitude of possible worlds… God must have chosen the best” (162).
This idea, however, presents the key problem to Leibniz’ view of God as a
perfect being and God as upholding the theodicy. I contend that Leibniz’
viewpoint allows for God to be either omnipotent or omnibenevolent, but not
both. An omnipotent god could create a world any way it desired, allowing only
evil, allowing only good, or a mixture of both. A god that possess creating
power but is only omnibenevolent would, in support of Leibniz, create the best
possible world for his creation to live in, but remain powerless to stop its
corruption. Leibniz’ view of God relies on too many exceptions for God (and
only for God) to remain perfect.
Leibniz’ view of God, and how a
perfect God can coincide with evil in the world, predicates upon the principle
of sufficient reason. This is simply to say everything that comes into
existence must have a necessary cause for existing. As Leibniz writes in The Monadology, God is a “necessary
substance” in almost an Aristotelian sense of necessity (124). God is necessary
as a substance because there must be a “final cause” (124). God’s existence in
itself “is a simple consequence of its being possible” and that God has sufficient
reason for himself (125). Sufficient reason is truly what Leibniz’ theology is
based upon; however this principle cannot exclusively apply to God and still be
taken seriously. What is sufficient reason for anything if it is simply to say
that because something is possible, it
therefore exists because it is necessary? What is worth being deemed
necessary? I understand that the monad God is not only sufficient cause for
creation, but also for what is to be considered what all truth is based upon,
but Leibniz’ principle is too open ended to simply posit God as the only
substance that is sufficient in itself to provide enough reason for all of
existence yet not powerful enough to
create an absolutely perfect world that reflects God as upholding the theodicy.
Peter Loptson states in the
introduction to Discourse on Metaphysics
that “there are many different kinds of perfection, all of which God possesses”
(59). I think Leibniz would agree to this statement simply because all
“contingent truths” really on sufficient reason and God is sufficient reason in
himself (124). Every form of perfection requires a definition which is the
truth of that perfection, since God is necessary, for Leibniz, to provide a
basis for these truths, God possesses all forms of truth and all forms of
perfection. This is a key issue as to why the fact that suffering and pain
exist is a violation to the theodicy and why this world cannot be the best of
all possible worlds. If God possesses all forms of perfection then he also
possesses the ability to make a perfect world. Leibniz, I believe, would
intercept my claim here to say that this is
a perfect world because to suppose that there is a better world is to posit
that God acted with less perfection that he is capable of. If I was to accept
Leibniz’ position I would have to say that God must either be only omnipotent
or only omnibenevolent, but not both. The problem with Leibniz’ view is the
fact that Leibniz supposes omnipotence. If God is truly all-powerful then God
would automatically have the resources necessary to create a world that did not
require suffering. To return to the example used in my introduction, in
Leibniz’ view it is necessary that one person suffer for the good of all
creation. There is simply not enough to go around in the world. For example, if
there were two people in the entire world, and the world was created with only
ten dollars, no more, no less, both people could have equal money at five
dollars apiece, or one person could have more than that at the other person’s
expense; consequently, there is no situation in which both people can have ten
dollars. If God is truly omnipotent and omnibenevolent, he automatically would
have the ability to create more money; allowing each person to have equality.
To suppose that God has created the
best possible world with evil in it, yet that God is both all-powerful and
all-benevolent is essentially a contradiction. I agree with Leibniz “that one
acts imperfectly if he acts with less perfection than he is capable of” (61).
Perhaps that is why I so wholeheartedly disagree with his view of God. Leibniz
supposes a God who is imperfect by the very definition Leibniz defines him as
perfect with. There is no situation in which an omnibenevolent, omnipotent
being has no other choice but to deem it necessary to create a situation that
inflicts suffering upon persons. That is the eternal problem in the theodicy,
if a being is omniscient, that being knows everything that is and could be. If
that being is also omnibenevolent, that being would know of a situation in
which there is only good. If that being is also omnipotent, then that being would
have the power to create a situation in which it knew that everything would be
good. If the being could not, then it is not omnipotent because omnipotence
would allow it to forever create a new situation in which everything is good.
If a being has no limits to its power and is benevolent then it can only be
perceived as imperfect if it does not act with the full extent of its
perfection. The Orthodox Christian God as the theodicy is only perfect in its
imperfection.
Perhaps I write on this subject in a
way that is too certain and too dogmatic. However, Leibniz reveals his own
certainty of his methodology at the end of the Discourse. The problem with Leibniz’ own certainty is defined
previously with his writing “To know in particular, however, the reasons that
have moved him to choose this order of the universe, to permit sin, to dispense
his salutary grace in a certain manner- this passes the capacity of the finite
mind” (62). I agree with Leibniz. Humans cannot fathom true omnipotence.
However, we can encounter the idea of it and engage it. Omnipotence is truly a
quality of God, however, not the quality of the God that potentially made this
world if we are to believe him to also be benevolent.
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